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by Zeynep N. Kaya and Matthew Whiting
Recently a group of
politicians and
commentators from
Turkey visited
Northern Ireland to
learn about its
peace process and
explore any lessons
this might hold for
the ongoing fragile
negotiations between the Turkish government and the imprisoned
leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan. The
visitors met with former rebels-turned-politicians from Sinn Féin as
well as senior British and Irish political figures, in a trip that was
endorsed by the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayip Erdogan.
But not all politicians in Turkey were happy with the direction of the
peace negotiations – the leader of the main opposition party, the
Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kermal Kılıçdaroğlu, has claimed in
the past that Britain’s actions in Northern Ireland were of a
fundamentally different nature and cannot serve as a model for
Turkey. Today, he is more supportive of entering negotiations with
Öcalan, but he is critical of the government for entering
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negotiations without working through cross-party parliamentary
structures. Therefore, it is prescient to ask if the Northern Irish
model has any lessons for Turkish officials to achieve peace?
It is easy to see why Northern Ireland has become a tempting model to
look to. The IRA and their political wing, Sinn Féin (literally translated as
‘We Ourselves’), emerged in Northern Ireland in 1969 and fought to unify
Ireland in a 30-year ethno-nationalist war against the British army
attempting to quell the rebellion along with British loyalists fighting to
remain part of the United Kingdom. Yet, what was seen as one of the
most intractable conflicts in post-World War II Europe was brought to a
negotiated end in 1998 through the Belfast Agreement, which established
a power-sharing settlement between the local adversaries. Given Turkey’s
own ethno-national insurgency led by the PKK since 1984, an organisation
geographically concentrated in the southeast of the country, the appeal
of the Northern Irish model is strong, especially when it is noted that the
conflict there was resolved while still retaining it as part of the United
Kingdom for the immediate future.
Looking for parallels in other peace processes can be valuable, and
Northern Ireland’s most immediate lesson appears to be that dialogue
helps. In Northern Ireland, both secret and publicised meetings between
Irish republicans and the British government were crucial to securing an
IRA ceasefire. Indeed, any negotiated end to an ethnic conflict requires
dialogue between the adversaries, and Turkey’s İmralı process marks an
important and potentially positive departure. Although there have been
limited attempts to negotiate with the PKK in 1991-93 and 1997, for
example, successive Turkish governments typically have eschewed open
negotiations with the PKK given their ongoing attacks against both
military and civilian targets. While today’s negotiations have their roots in
secret contacts between the Turkish National Intelligent Organisation and
the PKK in Oslo between 2010-11, the current pursuit of negotiations is
well known and publicised.
However, attempting to move beyond this most general idea that talking
with adversaries helps negotiations, it soon becomes clear that the
Northern Irish peace process is not open to easy emulation in Turkey. As
early as 25 years prior to the negotiated settlement, Britain indicated that
it accepted Sinn Féin’s goals of a united Ireland as a legitimate aspiration
as long as it was pursued democratically. In an earlier failed attempt to
broker peace in 1973, the British government indicated a willingness to
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allow Northern Ireland to secede if this was the majority will of its
inhabitants. At the same time, the government reversed a previous ban
on Sinn Féin and encouraged it to compete as a political party. When Sinn
Féin decided to take part in elections from 1981 onwards, the British
government did not suppress them, even though the IRA was conducting
a simultaneous bombing campaign. Famously, in 1990, Britain’s Northern
Ireland Secretary declared that the government had ‘no selfish strategic
or economic interest in Northern Ireland’. The British government
certainly implemented strong anti-terrorist legislation against the IRA, but
also consistently aimed for encouraging greater political engagement by
Sinn Féin. This meant that when it came to negotiations, republicans
could moderate more easily, knowing that their goals could be pursued
politically without being blocked by Britain and knowing that calling a
ceasefire did not entail rejecting their ethno-national aspirations.
In Turkey by contrast, successive governments in Ankara have been much
less encouraging of Kurdish politicisation. Most notably, a 10 percent
electoral threshold was implemented in the 1980s, making it practically
impossible for Kurdish parties to gain representation in the Turkish
Parliament and forcing them to enter into elections as independent
candidates instead. Demands for separation and engagement in
separatist activities are banned in the Turkish constitution and this has
led to the enforced dissolution of Kurdish political parties (and
communist and Islamist ones too) and the arrest and imprisonment of
many journalists, activists, academics, students, and lawyers for
engagement in separatist activities. In fact, until recently, Erdoğan has
insisted that the Kurdish independent parliamentarians and the BDP
party members disassociate themselves from Öcalan and his ideals.
At least two reasons can help explain the different approaches by the
central governments in Britain and Turkey. Firstly, Northern Ireland has
never been an important source of political power for any major British
party. Neither the Labour Party nor the Liberal Democrats ever fielded
candidates in Northern Ireland and while the Conservative Party
attempted this, they never received more than six percent of the vote
share. This made it easier for all major parties to agree to a policy of
allowing the people of Northern Ireland to decide their future, free of
partisan or self-serving directives from the central British government.
Secondly, the United Kingdom has always been an affiliation of different
nations under one authority, accepting different and overlapping
identities in the Celtic fringes to those in the centre. While it certainly
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used to be a strongly unitary state, in 1997 devolution to Scotland and
Wales allowed devolution in Northern Ireland to appear as part of a
normal political process, even if in reality it was undertaken in a very
different scenario.
In Turkey, neither of these conditions is in place. Southeast Turkey is an
important electoral battleground and the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) have built a significant support base there. The current peace
negotiations could potentially strengthen the influence of the AKP and the
BDP as electoral forces in southeast Turkey, much to the disquiet of their
political rivals. Additionally, the opposition CHP remains sceptical towards
these negotiations, in part because the process is linked to a bid by
Erdoğan to rewrite the Turkish constitution in his own vision.
Furthermore, although there are proposed changes for redefining Turkish
national identity in more inclusive terms, Turkey remains a highly unitary
and majoritarian state with a stronger commitment to a single over-
arching, civic-collectivist identity than exists in Britain. In short, the peace
process is an issue of political contestation, in which the major parties in
parliament have strong partisan interests, limiting the ability to find
widespread consensus of how to pursue peace.
Perhaps the most important lessons from Northern Ireland for Turkey
then, is that talking with ‘terrorists’ can be fruitful, but the success of such
talks may well depend on being able to act beyond the confines of party
politics and short-term partisan interests.
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